



At common law in England and the United States, parties to a
lawsuit and all other persons having a direct pecuniary or proprietary
interest- in the outcome of the action were excluded from testifying in
the case.' A party could not testify in his own behalf nor could he be
required to testify if called by his adversary. The rule was thus a
combination of disqualification and privilege.2 The theory of the
disqualification was that self-interest would probably cause such
persons to perjure themselves; therefore, they should be prevented
from giving testimony. 3 Defenders of the rule of exclusion realized, of
course, that perjury would not always result from self-interest and
that by silencing truthful persons the rule threatened honest litigants
with injustice, but they argued that the rule did more good than harm.4
No justification was advanced for the privilege. Jeremy Bentham, the
great English Reformer, made a determined attack upon the rule in
his Treatise on Evidence published in 1827 and, in the words of
Wigmore, "first furnished the arsenal of arguments for transforming
public opinion. '" 5 The unanswerable arguments that pecuniary interest
did not make it probable that parties and witnesses would commit
perjury, that the rule underestimated the ability of the judge and
jurors to detect perjury, and that it created intolerable injustice, were
taken up by such reformers as Denman and Brougham who led the
assault on the disqualification. Through their efforts and those of
others, professional opinion was gradually brought to the realization
that the disqualification created more injustice than it prevented. In
1843 a statute was enacted by Parliament abolishing the disqualifica-
tion of interested persons." And in 1851 another statute swept away
the disqualification of parties and those on whose behalf a suit was
brought or defended.7 These reforms spread to the United States, and
* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
I 2 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 575, 576 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as Wigmorel.
2 McCormick, Evidence § 65 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McCormick).
3 Gilbert, Evidence 119 (1727). Baron Gilbert's words were: "The law removes
them from testimony to prevent their sliding into perjury."
4 Starkie, Evidence 83 (1832): "The law must prescribe general rules; and experi-
ence proves that more mischief would result from the general reception of interested
witnesses than is occasioned by their exclusion."
5 2 Wigmore § 576. Bentham's attack is found in his Rationale of judicial Evidence,
book IX, pt. III, ch. III and pt. V, ch. 1.
6 Lord Denman's Act, 6 & 7 Vict., c. 85 (1843).
7 Lord Brougham's Act, 13 & 14 Vict., c. 99 (1851).
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the English statutes served as models for legislation here. As in
England the change was brought about in two steps: the first quali-
fying interested nonparties and the second qualifying parties. Un-
fortunately most of the states which enacted similar statutes departed
from the English model in a most significant respect. They retained a
portion of the old disqualification as an exception to the new rule of
qualification. At the time when the first statutes abolishing the-interest
disqualification were offered to the state legislatures in this country,
the objection was made that if parties and interested persons were
allowed to testify in cases involving contracts and transactions where
one party had died and the other survived, this would work a hardship
on the estate of the deceased.8 Since the lips of one party to the trans-
action were sealed by death, the suggestion was that the living party's
lips should be sealed by excluding his testimonyY This compromise
was accepted in most of the early statutes and became the pattern of
legislation in this country. Today in most jurisdictions the statutes
contain a general statement to the effect that no person shall be
disqualified because he is a party to a suit or proceeding or interested
in the issue to be tried.10 But they add a provision to the effect that
in suits brought or defended by an executor or administrator, such
persons shall remain incompetent to testify concerning a communica-
tion with the testator or intestate." While this is the most common type
of statute, there are many which vary substantially from this in
certain respects as will be noted later. The statutes usually provide
that the surviving party or interested person may testify if called by
the opposite party, thus doing away with the privilege feature of the
common-law rule. These statutes which retain the common-law interest
disqualification of parties and interested persons with respect to
testimony as to transactions with decedents are popularly known as
8 McCormick § 65.
) Owens v. Owens Adm'r, 14 W. Va. 88, 95 (1878): "The temptation to falsehood
and concealment in such cases is considered too great, to allow the surviving party to
testify in his own behalf. Any other view of this subject, I think, would place in great
peril the estates of the dead, and would in fact make them an easy prey for the dis-
honest and unscrupulous, which with due deference to the views and opinions of others,
it seems to me, the Legislature never intended."
10 There is now no state in which interest is a general disqualification.
11 In most statutes this protection against the testimony of the opposite party is
extended to persons who by reason of insanity are assumed to be handicapped as
witnesses for themselves. The present article does not deal with this phase of the dis-
qualification for two reasons: (1) space limitations and (2) the relative infrequency with
which such questions about competency of parties arise in actions by or against
guardians of insane persons.
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"Dead Man's Statutes" and now exist in some thirty-four states.' 2
They vary greatly in their wording and coverage, and the attitudes
of the courts differ as to their interpretation, even where similar pro-
visions are involved. Consequently, precedents from one state may be
of little value in another jurisdiction.
As a background for the subsequent discussion, it seems worth-
while to set forth the text of a few statutes to illustrate variation in
phraseology and the extent of the disqualification which the legisla-
tures sought to retain.
Alabama:
In civil suits and proceedings, . . . no person having a pecu-
niary interest in the result of the suit or proceeding shall be al-
lowed to testify against the party to whom his interest is opposed,
as to any transaction with, or statement by the deceased person
whose estate is interested in the result of the suit or proceeding, or
when such deceased person, at the time of such transaction or
statement, acted in any representative or fiduciary relation what-
soever to the party against whom such testimony is sought to be
introduced, unless called to testify thereto by the party to whom
such interest is opposed, or unless the testimony of such deceased
person in relation to such transaction or statement is introduced
in evidence by the party whose interest is opposed to that of the
witness, or has been taken and is on file in the cause. No person
who is an incompetent witness under this section shall make him-
self competent by transferring his interest to another. Code of
Alabama (1960) Title 7, § 433.
California:
Persons incompetent to be witnesses-Parties or assignors
of parties to a suit or proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an
action or proceeding is prosecuted, against an executor or adminis-
trator upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased
person, as to any matter or fact occurring before the death of such
12 Ala. Code fit. 7, § 433 (1960); Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1880 (1959); Colo. Rev.
Stat. Art. 153-1-2 (1953); Del. Code Ann. fit. 10, § 4302 (1953); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 90.05 (1960); Ga. Code Ann. § 38-1603 (1954); Idaho Code Ann. § 9-202 (1947);
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 51, § 2 (Supp. 1951); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-1715 (1946); Iowa Code
§ 622.4-622.6 (1958) ; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 60-2804 (1949) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. § 421.210(2)
(1960); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 113, § 119 (1954); Md. Ann. Code art. 35, § 3 (1957);
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27A.2160 (1961); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 595.04 (1947); Miss. Code
Ann. § 1690 (1956); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 491.010 (1952); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1201
(1956); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 347 (1961); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-51 (1951); N.D. Cent.
Code § 31-01-03 Thru -05 (1960); Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.03 (1955); Okla. Stat. Ann.
fit. 12, § 384 (1960) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, § 322 (1958) ; S.C. Code § 26-402 (1952) ;
Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-105 (1955); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 3716 (1925); Utah Code
Ann. § 78-24-2 (1953); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§ 1602 and 1603 (Supp. 1961); Wash.
Rev. Code ch. 5.60.030 (1961); IV. Va. Code Ann. § 5726 (1961); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§§ 325.16 and 325.17 (1958); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-140 (1957).
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deceased person. California Code of Civil Procedure § 1880
(1959).
New York:
Personal transaction or communication between witness and
decedent or lunatic. Upon the trial of an action or the hearing
upon the merits of a special proceeding, a party or a person inter-
ested in the event, or a person from, through or under whom such
a party or interested person derives his interest or title by assign-
ment or otherwise, shall not be examined as witness in his own
behalf or interest, or in behalf of the party succeeding to his title
or interest against the executor, administrator or survivor of a
deceased person or the committee of a lunatic, or a person deriving
his title or interest from, through or under a deceased person, or
lunatic, by assignment or otherwise, concerning a personal trans-
action or communication between the witness and the deceased
person or lunatic, except where the executor, administrator, sur-
vivor, committee or person so deriving title or interest is examined
in his own behalf, or the testimony of a lunatic or deceased person
is given in evidence, concerning the same transaction or com-
munication. A person shall not be deemed interested for the pur-
poses of this section by reason of being a stockholder or officer
of any banking corporation which is a party to the action or
proceeding, or interested in the event thereof.
No party or person interested in the event, who is otherwise
competent to testify, shall be disqualified from testifying by the
possible imposition of costs against him or the award of costs to
him. A party or person interested in the event or a person from,
through, or under whom such a party or interested person derives
his interest or title by assignment or otherwise, shall not be quali-
fied for the purposes of this section, to testify in his own behalf or
interest, or in behalf of the party succeeding to his title or interest,
to personal transactions or communications with the donee of a
power of appointment in an action or proceeding for the probate
of a will, which exercises or attempts to exercise a power of appoint-
ment granted by the will of a donor of such power, or in an action
or proceeding involving the construction of the will of the donee
after its admission to probate.
Nothing contained in this section, however, shall render a
person incompetent to testify as to the facts of an accident or the
results therefrom where the proceeding, hearing, defense or cause of
action involves a claim of negligence or contributory negligence in
an action wherein one or more parties is the representative of a de-
ceased or incompetent person based upon, or by reason of, the
operation or ownership of a motor vehicle being operated upon the
highways of the state, or the operation or ownership of aircraft
being operated in the air space over the state, or the operation or
ownership of a vessel on any of the lakes, rivers, streams, canals
or other waters of this state, but this provision shall not be con-
strued as permitting testimony as to conversations with the de-




In actions by or against executors, administrators, or guard-
ians, in which judgment may be rendered for or against them as
such, neither party shall be allowed to testify against the others
as to any transaction with, or statement by, the testator, intestate
or ward, unless called to testify thereto by the opposite party; and
the provisions of this article shall extend to and include all actions
by or against the heirs or legal representatives of a decedent arising
out of any transaction with such decedent. Texas Revised Civil
Statutes, 1925, Article 3716.
West Virginia:
No party to any action, suit or proceeding, nor any person
interested in the event thereof, nor any person from, through or
under whom any such party or interested person derives any inter-
est or title by assignment or otherwise, shall be examined as a
witness in regard to any personal transaction or communication
between such witness and a person at the time of such examination,
deceased, insane or lunatic, against the executor, administrator,
heir-at-law, next of kin, assignee, legatee, devisee or survivor of
such person, or the assignee or committee of such insane person
or lunatic. But this prohibition shall not extend to any transaction
or communication as to which any such executor, administrator,
heir-at-law, next of kin, assignee, legatee, devisee, survivor or com-
mittee shall be examined on his own behalf, nor as to which the
testimony of such deceased person or lunatic shall be given in evi-
dence: Provided, however, that where an action is brought for
causing the death of any person by any wrongful act, neglect or
default under article seven, chapter fifty-five of this Code, the
person sued, or the servant, agent or employee of any firm or cor-
poration sued, shall have the right to give evidence in any case in
which he or it is sued, but he may not give evidence of any con-
versation with the deceased. West Virginia Code (1961) § 5726.
II. APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTES
Limitations of space prevent extensive discussion of the pro-
visions of any one statute or its interpretation by the courts of the
particular state. The purpose of this portion of the paper will be to
call attention to express provisions of the statutes concerning their
application, to point up some of the vagaries and inconsistencies which
have resulted from attempts on the part of the courts to interpret
and apply the statutes of their particular states, and to demonstrate
that the statutes not only fail to accomplish their purported purpose
but actually are instruments of injustice. To do this, the discussion
will be divided into three parts: (A) Actions in which the statutes
apply, (B) Persons whose testimony is excluded, and (C) Subject
matter of testimony excluded. The cases discussed or cited will be
used for purposes of illustration only and no attempt will be made
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to give any definitive statement of the law of a particular state. The
statutes have been listed in an earlier note and the citations will not be
repeated in the ensuing footnotes.
A. Actions in Which the Statutes, Apply
Since the purported purpose of the statutes is to protect the
estates of the dead from false claims, it is clear that they were never
intended to apply to all kinds of actions. The extent of coverage
depends upon the wording of the particular statute. While in some
states such as Delaware, Minnesota, North Dakota, Tennessee and
Texas, the statutes apply in any action by or against an executor or
administrator in his representative capacity, many of the statutes
such as those of California, Idaho, Florida, New York and Oklahoma
apply only where the suit is against the estate, i.e., where the executor
or administrator is the defendant. This limitation seems strange in-
deed. If the estate needs protection from self-interested perjury where
the suit is against the estate, why is not the same protection needed
when the estate brings the suit on some claim? The opposite party's
incentive to commit perjury cannot be less in the latter situation. That
such limitation leads to anomalous results is well-illustrated by a
California case. The administrator of an estate sued defendant for
damaging intestate's car in a collision. Defendant claimed that the
intestate was solely responsible for the collision and counterclaimed.
The court held that defendant could testify in support of his defense
since no claim against the estate was involved, but not in support of
his counterclaim because it was a claim against the estate.13 The result
does not make sense but appears necessitated by the wording of the
statute.14 By the express wording of the California statute, it would
seem that the legislature intended it to apply to all actions against the
estate. But the California courts do not so interpret it. They hold
that the statute applies only where the claim is adverse to the estate,
i.e., seeking relief which will diminish or impair it. Thus, where an
heir or legatee brings a suit seeking to share in the estate, the claim is
not adverse because it does not operate to diminish the estate, and
the statute does not apply.15 This appears to be a highly technical and
tortured construction of the statute. If the danger of perjury is present
13 George v. McManus, 27 Cal. App. 414, 150 Pac. 73 (1915).
14 See Chadbourn, "History and Interpretations of the California Dead Man's
Statute: A Proposal for Liberalization," 4 U.C.LA.L. Rev. 175, 203 (1956). This scholarly
and definitive article points out defects in the statute and numerous anomalies in the
decisions. I am indebted to Professor Chadbourn for California illustrations given in
the text.
15 Id. at 187.
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in one kind of claim against the estate, it is just as much so in another.
One further anomaly: where plaintiff sued the estate claiming to be
decedent's common-law wife, and asking for a monthly allowance for
support pending administration, the statute was held not to prevent
her from testifying since this was, in effect, an application for partial
distribution of the estate and not an adverse claim.' 6 In contrast, a
suit brought by one claiming to be a creditor of the estate for services
rendered the deceased during his later years is an adverse claim and
the alleged creditor may not testify. How can it be said that evidence
in the latter situation is any less trustworthy than that in the former?
Some statutes, like those of Georgia, Iowa, Illinois, Kansas, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin, by express terms extend the protection to anyone who
derives his title or sustains his liability to the cause of action from,
through or under the decedent. Such persons may include not only
executors and administrators, but heirs, next of kin, legatees, devisees
and assignees. Of course, the reason behind such statutes favors the
extension of the protection to successors in interest. Whatever danger
of perjury exists is not lessened by the presence of one of these
persons as a party instead of an executor or administrator. In Texas
the statute was extended, apparently as an afterthought, to heirs,
but does not include actions by or against legatees, devisees, assignees
or other persons who derive title or claim through the decedent.' 7
Most of the statutes by express terms provide that they are
applicable in any civil suit or proceeding. Thus they apply in tort
actions as well as contract suits. However, the West Virginia statute
expressly exempts actions for wrongful death of decedent from its
terms except as to conversations with decedent.:' The courts of
Maryland and Texas have interpreted their statutes as inapplicable
in wrongful death actions.' 9 This is understandable since a wrongful
death action is not derivative; it belongs to the survivor named in
the statute rather than to the estate, although the statute sometimes
16 Estate of McCasland, 52 Cal. 568 (1878).
17 Newton v. Newton, 77 Tex. 508, 14 S.W. 157 (1890) (Where the suit is by or
against a legatee or devisee and no parties named in the statute are necessary parties,
the statute does not apply). In a suit against devisees or executors where the latter
were not necessary parties, the statute was held not applicable, Stiles v. Hawkins, 207
S.W. 89 (Tex. Com. App. 1918).
18 W. Va. Code Ann. § 5726 (1961). The Wyoming statute excepts wrongful death
actions from its provisions. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-140 (1957). See Annot., 45 A.L.R.
1477 (1926).
19 State v. Brainin, 224 Md. 156, 167 A.2d 117 (1961); Canales v. Bank of Cali-
fornia, 316 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
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provides that the action may be brought by the administrator under
certain circumstances.
In 1926 the Kentucky statute was amended to exempt tort actions
from its operation, presumably for the primary purpose of permitting
testimony by the survivor of an automobile accident. The result is
that when an action sounds in tort, the survivor's testimony is
admitted; if it sounds in contract, the testimony is excluded. The
courts have experienced difficulty in interpreting and applying the
exception. Inconsistencies will result when a contract action is
coexistent with a tort action. Suppose, for example, that a tort has
resulted in unjust enrichment of the survivor at the expense of the
deceased. The personal representative has a choice of theories: quasi-
contract or tort. If he chooses the former, he may exclude the survivor's
testimony, but if he sues in tort the survivor may testify. This is
ridiculous for there can be no difference in the trustworthiness of
the testimony in the two situations.2'
There is a conflict among the states as to whether the Dead Man's
Statutes are applicable to probate proceedings and will contests. In
some jurisdictions such proceedings are expressly exempted by the
statute; in others they are expressly included. In states where the
statutes contain no specific reference to such proceedings, the majority
of courts hold that the person opposing the probate or contesting the
will is not claiming adversely to the estate but is merely seeking a
part of the estate; therefore, the statute is not applicable.' Other
states, however, apply the statute to such proceedings 3 Since the
policy of the statute is to protect the estates of decedents, it can well
be argued that the statutes should be limited to suits between the
estate and strangers. However, the person opposing the probate or
contesting the will has as much motive to falsify as the stranger.
B. Persons Whose Testimony Is Excluded
On the question of what persons are disqualified to give testi-
mony, there is a great variance in the express terms of the statutes
and in the interpretations by the courts. Some statutes disqualify
"parties" only, 4 others disqualify both "parties" and "persons inter-
20 See Niles v. Luttrell, 61 F. Supp. 778, 783 (W.D. Ky. 1945).
21 38 Ky. L.J. 471, 473 (1950).
22 Henry v. Hall, 106 Ala. 84, 17 So. 187 (1895); Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb. 403,
94 N.W. 705 (1903) ; Griffith v. Benzinger, 144 Md. 575, 125 At. 512 (1924).
23 McKibban v. Scott, 131 Tex. 182, 114 S.W.2d 213 (1938); In re Wind's Estate,
27 Wash. 2d 421, 178 P.2d 731 (1947).
24 Maine, Maryland, Ohio, Georgia, Missouri, Pennsylvania and Vermont dis-
qualify the surviving party to the transaction. Delaware, North Dakota, Tennessee and
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ested in the event of the action, 20 and some of the statutes extend
the disqualification to "assignors of" or "persons from or through
whom" such parties or interested persons derive their title, interest
or claim.26 Who are parties within the meaning of the statutes?
Normally the courts hold that the term party means a party of record
with an interest in the outcome of the suit, and that a nominal or formal
party of record with no interest is not disqualified2 7 However, in some
states the courts follow the strict letter of the statute and exclude
the testimony of record parties even though they are merely nominal
parties and have no interest.2" For example, in an Iowa case where
the dispute was as to who were the heirs, an executor who was only
a nominal party was excluded,29 the court feeling bound to follow the
explicit language of the statute. And in Maryland, a next friend,
who was a mere nominal party, was disqualified."0 These decisions
appear to have lost sight of the philosophy of the statute; no self-
interest is present here to tempt the witness to perjury. Although by
its terms the Texas statute disqualifies only parties, the courts have
long held that "party" includes persons who are pecuniarily interested
in the outcome even though they are not parties of record.3 Thus,
where one spouse sues or is being sued for community property, the
other spouse cannot testify as to a transaction with a decedent
although not a party of record."2 In such a situation, of course, what-
ever danger of perjury exists is the same as to the spouse who is not
Texas disqualify both parties to the suit. In California, the living party is disqualified
only if he is the plaintiff with a claim against the estate.
25 Alabama, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Utah.
26 California, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Nevada, New York,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah and Wisconsin.
27 Wolf v. Powner, 30 Ohio St. 472 (1876) (husband who joined wife because of
her coverture was only a formal or nominal party and could testify); Lehman v.
Krahl, 155 Tex. 270, 285 S.W.2d 179 (1955) (husband of legatee, whom a statute
required to be joined as a party, was not disqualified); Raab v. Wallerick, 46 Wash. 2d
375, 282 P.2d 271 (1955).
28 Wing v. Andrews, 59 Me. 505 (1871).
29 In re Conner's Estate, 240 Iowa 479, 36 N.W.2d 833 (1949) (5-to-4 decision).
Compare the contrary holding in Pruner v. Lovejoy, 314 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App.
1958) (partition proceeding: the estate had been fully administered except for
partition. The court held that, at this stage, the administrator was only a nominal party
and could testify).
30 Allers v. Leitch, 213 Md. 390, 131 A.2d 458 (1957).
31 Simpson v. Brotherton, 62 Tex. 170 (1884). Oklahoma, with a similar provision,
refuses to construe the word party to include one interested in the outcome but who is
not a party of record. Wright v. Quinn, 201 Okla. 565, 207 P.2d 912 (1949). To like
effect is Holey v. Quick, 149 Me. 306, 101 A.2d 187 (1953).
32 Newton v. Newton, 77 Tex. 508, 14 S.W. 157 (1890).
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a record party. But the court did not need to extend the disqualifica-
tion by judicial construction to persons not included in the statute.
Since the majority of the statutes disqualify persons interested
in the event of the action and other statutes are interpreted by the
courts as having that effect, it becomes important to determine the
kind of interest which is sufficient to disqualify. Usually only a
pecuniary or proprietary interest will suffice. Thus, close family rela-
tionship by blood or marriage, such as parent, child, husband or
wife, will normally not render a witness incompetent.3 But there are
decisions in some states to the contrary. A Florida court refused to
allow a son to testify in a suit by his mother, although he was not
pecuniarily interested. 4 A Pennsylvania case has held a spouse to be
disqualified in an action where the other spouse is a party, 5 and the
Iowa statute contains this express disqualification.36 In a most extreme
result, the Illinois Supreme Court disqualified the party's divorced
wife. 7 A mere interest in seeing one party succeed is usually not
sufficient to disqualify. Thus the fact that the witness is an agent
of a party or an agent or officer of a corporate party will not, in most
states, render him incompetent.38 Statutes, however, in Michigan,
North Dakota, Tennessee and Wisconsin make the corporate officer
or trustee incompetent, and those of North Dakota and Michigan also
disqualify an agent. A federal court interpreted "party" as used in
the Delaware statute as including officers of corporate parties 9 In
most jurisdictions, an attorney for a party is not disqualified merely
33 Weese v. Yokum, 62 W. Va. 550, 59 S.E. 514 (1907) (father); Nelson v.
Zeigler, 196 W. 426, 220 N.W. 194 (1928) (parents of plaintiff in malpractice action) ;
Barnett v. Andrew, 81 W. Va. 283, 94 S.E. 144 (1917) (daughter of plaintiff); Carlson
v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 255 Wis. 407, 39 N.W.2d 442 (1949) (wife of plaintiff in
automobile collision suit); Rusk v. Rusk, 52 S.W.2d 1108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932)
(plaintiff's sister, brother and brother's wife); Hennenberger v. Sheahan, 278 S.W.2d
497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (niece and other relatives).
34 Jensen v. Lance, 88 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1956) (relationship was the sole basis of
the decision despite an announced policy of strict construction of the statute).
35 In re Wistoykey's Estate, 1 Adams County L.J. 43 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1960).
36 Iowa Code § 622.4 (1958).
37 Hann v. Brooks, 331 Ill. App. 535, 73 N.E.2d 627 (1947). See critical comment
in 46 Mich. L. Rev. 664 (1948).
38 Guernsey v. Loyola Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 226 Md. 77, 172 A.2d 506
(1961); Thompson v. McAlen Federated Womens' Bldg. Corp., 273 S.W.2d 105 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1954); Balla v. Sladek, 381 Pa. 85, 112 A.2d 156 (1955) (agent); Nolan v.
Standard Fire Ins. Co., 243 Wis. 30, 9 N.W.2d 74 (1943) (agent); Gaulden v. Antone,
279 S.W. 560 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) (president of corporation); L. C. Jones Trucking
Co. v. Jenkins, 313 P.2d 530 (Okla. 1957).
39 Lake Shore Natl Bank v. Ballanca Aircraft Corp., 83 F. Supp. 795 (D. Del.
1949), aff'd per curiam, 78 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1950).
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because he is interested in seeing his client win and is to receive a
fee. 40 However, the Kentucky court disqualified an attorney whose
testimony might augment his fee.41 The slightest pecuniary interest
may sometimes be enough to render the witness incompetent. For
example, an Alabama case held that ownership by the witness of one
share of stock of a corporate party disqualified him, although a
corporate officer could testify.42 The test of interest has been stated
by one court thus: Whether the witness will "gain or lose by the
direct legal operation and effect of the judgment or that the record
will be legal evidence against him in some other action"; 43 and by
another court in these words: "whether the witness will be bound by
any judgment which may be rendered under the pleadings. 44 Thus
in Washington and Texas, where one spouse is a party to a suit
involving community property, the other spouse cannot testify.4
Any person on whose behalf or for whose benefit an action is brought
is an interested person and therefore incompetent. 46 These include heirs,
legatees, and devisees, except, of course, in states where suits by such
persons for a part of the estate are not considered claims against
the estate.4
7
Since competency is tested as of the time testimony is uttered, it
would seem that a person who has no pecuniary or proprietary interest
at the time he is offered as a witness would be qualified. However, as
has been noted, statutes in many states expressly disqualify assignors
and other persons through or from whom a party or interested person
derives his title, interest or claim.48 In the absence of such a provision,
40 In re Will of Henderson, 272 Wis. 163, 74 N.W.2d 739 (1956); Hudson v. Fuson,
15 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Parker v. Priestley, 39 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 1949).
The Florida court indicated that if he were on a contingent fee this might disqualify him,
but to the contrary see Davidson v. Gray, 97 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); Wright
v. Quinn, supra note 31.
41 Garnett v. Walton, 242 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Ky. 1951).
42 Ludden & Bates v. Watt, 18 Ala. App. 652, 94 So. 239 (1922). Contrary holdings
are found in Oklahoma, Mud Products Co. v. Gutowsky, 274 P.2d 389 (Okla. 1954);
and Maryland, Guernsey v. Loyola Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, supra note 38. The
North Dakota and Wisconsin statutes bar the agent's testimony.
43 Oliver v. Williams, 163 Ala. 376, 50 So. 937 (1909).
44 Corbell v. Koog, 188 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
45 Boettcher v. Busse, 45 Wash. 2d 579, 277 P.2d 368 (1954); Newton v. Newton,
supra note 32.
46 Alford v. Henderson, 237 Ala. 27, 185 So. 386 (1938) (issue as to validity of
deed by testator to one of devisees; devisee incompetent); In re Valentine's Will, 93
Wis. 45, 67 N.W. 12 (1897) (heir who would benefit by the revocation of a will cannot
testify as to revocation).
47 Henry v. Hall, supra note 22. See Chadbourn, supra note 14, at 187 and 189.
48 States listed in note 26 supra.
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it is usually held that one who has disposed of his interest through a
bona fide disclaimer, gift or assignment is a competent witness,49
but there is authority to the contrary. 0 Even where recognized, how-
ever, disengagement may be extremely difficult to accomplish. In a
Texas case, decedent allegedly promised to pay his nephew for medical
services, payment to be out of his estate. The nephew transferred the
claim for services to his wife who formed a corporation, wholly owned
by her, to which she transferred the claim. In a suit by the corporation
against the executor of the estate, the nephew was held incompetent
to testify as to an oral agreement with decedent for the services.Y'
The supreme court placed the burden upon the nephew to show that
the transfer was bona fide and that he no longer had an interest in the
claim.2 This is contrary to the usual rule that the burden is upon the
one challenging competency.
The requirement of a pecuniary interest seems artificial since
many other factors such as close family relationship or employment
may influence a witness' testimony as much as a direct pecuniary
benefit from the suit.
C. Subject Matter of Testimony Excluded
Where the action is one to which the statute applies, and the
witness offered is one who is disqualified, the final question becomes
one of whether the particular testimony is to be excluded. By their
terms some statutes exclude all the testimony of the witness with certain
express exceptions.53 Others disqualify the witness as to all matters
occurring before the death of the decedent.14 Some limit the dis-
qualification to any matter as to which the deceased might have been
able to testify had he lived.5 5 The largest number of statutes, however,
49 Adams Marine Service Co. Inc. v. Fishel, 42 Wash. 2d 555, 257 P.2d 203 (1953)
(principal stockholder and president of corporate party, who disposed of all his stock
and resigned as president after commencement of action but before trial, was held
competent); See Annot., 163 A.L.R. 1210, 1225 (1946). It is immaterial that the pur-
pose of the transfer was to remove the disability As a witness. Ragsdale v. Ragsdale,
142 Tex. 476, 179 S.W.2d 291 (1944).
50 Jernigan v. Gibbs, 26 Ala. App. 93, 89 So. 196 (1921).
51 Ditto v. Ditto Investment Co., 158 Tex. 104, 309 S.W.2d 219 (1958).
52 See the vigorous dissenting opinion by Garwood, J., in which he takes the
majority to task for failing to distinguish between "avoiding" the Dead Man's Statute
and "evading" it. He urges that it was error for the trial court to presume that the
assignment of the claim was all a pure fake, and he says the burden should be on the
party challenging the transfer to show that it was not bona fide.
53 Illinois, Maine, Missouri, Ohio and Wyoming.
54 California, Idaho, Indiana, Nevada, Pennsylvania and Washington.
55 Michigan and Utah.
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provide that the witness (party, interested person, assignor, etc.)
shall not be competent to testify as to any transaction with or
statement by the decedent.6
The courts appear to have experienced great difficulty in deter-
mining what constitutes a "transaction." It seems likely that the legis-
latures had in mind contractual and commercial dealings. 57 But the
courts, despite their oft-announced principle of strict construction,
have given a broad interpretation to the term transaction, thus
extending the scope of the disqualification. Among the things which
have been considered transactions are: execution of deeds, 5 delivery
of deeds and property, 9 contracts,60 marriage,6' gifts,O payment of
money,63 and services rendered.64 Thus, in some states, a party suing
the estate may not testify as to services performed or the value
thereofY The practical consequence is that a survivor who has per-
formed such services for one whom he trusted, without securing a
written agreement, is helpless if the latter dies and the estate declines
to pay. Some courts do permit testimony by the survivor as to the
services rendered and their value, but exclude his testimony as to non-
payment by the decedent; 66 the theory being that as to the former, the
56 Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland,
Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas and Wisconsin. Some of these use the phrase "personal transaction."
57 The Arkansas court held "transaction" to be synonymous with "business deal" or
"negotiation" in accord with Webster's New International Dictionary. Rankin v. Morgan,
193 Ark. 751, 102 S.W.2d 552 (1937). See also Shaneybrook v. Blizzard, 209 Md. 304,
121 A.2d 218 (1956) and Harper v. Johnson, 162 Tex. 117, 345 S.W.2d 277 (1961).
58 Haley v. Lee, 241 S.V. 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
59 North v. North, 2 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
60 Haywood v. Hollingsworth, 255 Ala. 453, 51 So. 2d 674 (1951); Rork v. Klein,
206 Iowa 809, 221 N.V. 460 (1928).
61 Catlett v. Chestnut, 107 Fla. 498, 146 So. 241 (1933).
02 Atchley v. Rimmer, 148 Tenn. 303, 255 SA. 366 (1923).
63 Hughes v. Wachter, 61 N.D. 513, 238 N.V. 776 (1931); Altgelt v. Brister, 57
Tex. 432 (1882).
64 Sklaire v. Turner's Estate, 12 App. Div. 2d 386, 212 N.Y.S.2d 389 (1961);
Barnhill v. Kirk, 44 Tex. 589 (1876); Young v. Burke, 139 Colo. 305, 338 P.2d 284
(1959).
65 Sklaire v. Turner's Estate, supra note 64 (physician suing for professional
services); Young v. Burke, supra note 64; Gordon v. Pledger, 271 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1954). There is authority to the contrary: Kirkpatrick v. Milks, 257 Wis. 549, 44-
N.W.2d 574 (1950), holding that performance of services is not a transaction since this
relates to no act of decedent.
66 Hunt v. Murdock, 229 Ala. 227, 156 So. 841 (1934) (services rendered) ; Garvin
v. Hughes, 249 Ala. 126, 30 So. 2d 245 (1947) (value); Burnett v. Garrison, 261 Ala.
622, 75 So. 2d 144 (1954) (testimony as to payment by decedent barred).
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witness is testifying as to his own acts. Is the witness more apt to tell
the truth as to one fact than as to the other?
Automobile collisions have often been treated as transactions, with
the result that the survivor's testimony was either entirely excluded
or mutilated.67 In many states where A's car collides with one driven
by B, who is killed in the collision, A may not testify as to how the
accident happened or the circumstances leading up to it."5 Other courts
hold that the survivor can testify to his own actions and the position
and movements of his own car immediately prior to the collision, but
may not testify as to those of decedent or his vehicle.69 Some courts
have even disqualified a passenger in the survivor's car,7° but others
have declined to extend the gag to the passenger. 71 To classify an
automobile collision as a "transaction" between the drivers of the cars
is to completely disregard the customary and ordinary meaning of
the word. It is unbelievable that the legislatures, in seeking to protect
estates of decedents from false claims, could have intended to include
in "transaction" such an involuntary and fortuitous contact as an
automobile collision. Such decisions are not only unwarranted judicial
extensions of the statute, but they create an intolerable injustice in
denying the survivor the right to give his story to the triers. Fortu-
nately the trend of recent decisions in several states is running against
the disqualification. 71 Other unsought and violent contacts, however,
67 Strode v. Dyer, 115 W. Va. 733, 177 S.E. 878 (1934); Southern Natural Gas Co.
v. Davidson, 225 Ala. 171, 142 So. 63 (1932); In re Mueller's Estate, 166 Neb. 376, 89
N.W.2d 137 (1958); Van Meter v. Goldfarb, 317 Ill. 620, 14 N.E. 391 (1925); Rogers
v. Carmichael, 58 Ga. App. 343, 198 S.E. 318 (1938); Zeigler v. Moore, 75 Nev. 91, 335
P.2d 425 (1959); Boyd v. Williams, 207 N.C. 30, 175 S.E. 832 (1934); Stephens v.
Short, 41 Wyo. 324, 285 P.2d 797 (1930). The cases are collected in 80 A.L.R.2d 1296
(1961).
68 Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Davidson, supra note 67; Clark v. Storchak, 33S
Ill. 564, 52 N.E.2d 229 (1943); In re Mueller's Estate, supra note 67; Zeigler v.
Moore, supra note 67; Miller v. Walsh's Adm'r, 240 Ky. 822, 43 S.W.2d 42 (1931).
69 McCarthy v. Woolston, 210 App. Div. 152, 205 N.Y.S. 507 (1924); Kilmer v.
Gustason, 211 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1954).
70 Thomas v. Tomay, 394 Pa. 299, 147 A.2d 321 (1959). In some states the pas-
senger can testify as to the acts of his own driver, but not as to the acts of the driver of
the other car. Strode v. Dyer, supra note 67. Some courts exclude the passenger's testi-
mony in a suit against his own driver. Boyd v. Williams, supra note 68; Sollinger v.
Himchak, 402 Pa. 232, 166 A.2d 531 (1961); Busser v. Noble, 22 Ill. App. 2d 433, 161
N.E.2d 150 (1959).
71 Gibson v. McDonald, 265 Ala. 426, 91 So. 2d 679 (1956); Shaneybrook v.
Blizzard, supra note 57; Day v. Stickle, 113 So. 2d 559 (Fla. App. 1959).
72 Harper v. Johnson, supra note 57, overruling the earlier Civil Appeals decision
in Andreades v. McMillan, 256 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Rankin v. Morgan,
supra note 57; Christofiel v. Johnson, 40 Tenn. App. 197, 290 S.W.2d 215 (1956);
Turbot v. Repp, 247 Iowa 69, 72 N.W.2d 565 (1955); Knoepple v. Suko, 108 N.W.2d
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may bring about a disqualification as in a West Virginia case where
the survivor was not permitted to testify that he was shot by decedent. 73
Some courts have said that "transaction" includes "every method
by which one person can derive impressions or information from the
conduct, condition or language of another."74 On this theory, testi-
mony as to facts learned or opinions formed from observing dece-
dent's conducl is held to be a transaction.7 Thus, in a West Virginia
case, an interested witness was not allowed to give an opinion as to
the genuineness of decedent's signature formed by having seen him
write his signature.76 But if the opinion had been formed by a bank
teller who had become familiar with the signature through handling
decedent's checks, he could have testified because no personal transac-
tion with decedent was involved. The Texas courts refuse to allow a
party or interested witness to give an opinion as to testator's sanity
even though it is based entirely on observation. 77 A Kentucky decision
disallowed the testimony of an interested witness as to the contents
of a lost will because testatrix had shown the will to the witness and
this was considered a transaction with testatrix.78
Statutes of some states, such as Iowa, West Virginia and Wis-
consin, use the phrase "personal transaction." As indicated, West
Virginia courts say this includes personal contact such as shooting of
the survivor by the deceased, or observing decedent's conduct such as
writing his signature. The Iowa court held that the witness could not
testify that he loaned money to decedent, nor that decedent later
admitted his indebtedness to the witness and promised to pay it,
456 (N.D. 1961); Shaneybrook v. Blizzard, supra note 57; Herring v. Eiland, 81 So. 2d
645 (Fla. 1955). Cases collected in Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 1290 (1961). The New York
statute, as amended in 1940, expressly provides that it shall not prevent any person
from testifying as to the facts of an automobile accident. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 347.
73 Clark v. Douglas, 139 W. Va. 691, 81 S.E.2d 112 (1954), noted 39 Minn. L. Rev.
609 (1955).
74 Holcomb v. Holcomb, 95 N.Y. 316, 325 (1884). This definition has been quoted
by many courts. Maciejczak v. Bartell, 187 Wash. 113, 60 P.2d 31 (1936); Stephens v.
Short, 41 Wyo. 324, 285 Pac. 797 (1930).
75 Holland v. Nimitz, 111 Tex. 419, 232 S.V. 298 (Comm. App. 1921).
76 Johnson v. Bee, 84 W. Va. 532, 100 S.E. 486 (1919).
77 Holland v. Ninitz, supra note 75 (will contest: evidence by daughter and heir
of testatrix that from observation of testatrix's acts, conduct and mental and physical
condition, she was of the opinion that testatrix was insane at time of making will,
excluded). See also Ragsdale v. Ragsdale, supra note 49, and Freeman v. Freeman, 71
W. Va. 303, 76 S.E. 657 (1912). An Iowa decision takes a contrary view, saying this is
not a "personal transaction" within the Iowa statute. Denning v. Butcher, 91 Iowa 426,
59 N.W. 69 (1894).
78 Gibbs v. Terry, 281 S.WV.2d 712 (Ky. 1955).
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because this was "personal. 79 However, if the witness overheard
decedent tell X that he needed money to repay the money borrowed
from the witness, then the witness could testify as to that conversation,
because this was not a personal transaction with decedent.
By statute in California and other states, the witness may not
testify as to any matter occurring before the death of decedent. In a
recent California case, the court said that such testimony was to be
excluded even though the event to which the testimony related did not
occur in decedent's presence. 0 In that case a tenant sued the owner
for injuries allegedly due to negligent maintenance. The owner was
not present at the occurrence and died after the action was instituted.
The tenant was not permitted to testify as to the accident, the court
admitting, however, that the deposition of the owner, stating that he
was not present could, if it had been taken, have been enough to let
in the tenant's testimony. Thus the decedent, through his employee,
was allowed to testify while the tenant was barred from rebutting his
testimony, an obvious injustice.
Negative testimony is usually regarded as just as much within
the purview of the statute as positive testimony. Thus in a majority
of jurisdictions, a party or interested person is incompetent to deny
that a particular transaction occurred.8' He will not be permitted to
testify, for example, to such things as the following: that he was not
indebted to decedent, 2 that decedent had not paid him money owed,
3
that he did not sign or execute the instrument in suit, 4 that he did not
deliver a certain instrument to decedent, 5 or that he did not use
undue influence upon decedent.86 The last situation mentioned is well
illustrated by a Texas case. In a will contest, third persons who were
79 Secor v. Siver, 161 N.W. 769 (Iowa 1917), modified on rehearing, 188 Iowa 1126,
176 N.W. 981 (1920); Carlson v. Bankers Trust Co., 242 Iowa 1207, 50 N.W.2d 1 (1951).
80 Corso v. Smith, 171 Cal. App. 2d 816, 342 P.2d 56 (1959). Compare the test in
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Jones, 303 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957), taken from earlier
Texas cases (whether if the witness offered should testify falsely, the deceased, if living,
could controvert it of his own personal knowledge).
81 The cases are collected and arranged according to subject matter in Annot., 8
A.L.R.2d 1090 (1949). Cases holding contra are also listed.
82 Tucker v. Tucker, 316 Ill. 671, 45 N.E.2d 558 (1942).
83 Well v. Lambert, 183 Md. 233, 37 A.2d 312 (1944); Hughes v. Wachter, 61
N.D. 513, 238 NA. 776 (1931).
84 Hughes v. Etheridge, 39 Ga. App. 730, 148 S.E. 358 (1929); Quails v. Monroe
County Bank, 229 Ala. 315, 156 So. 846 (1934).
85 Re Ferris' Estate, 234 Iowa 960, 14 N.W.2d 889 (1944); Martin v. Schaen, 26
Wash. 2d 346, 173 P.2d 968 (1946).
86 Harris v. Harris' Estate, 276 S.W.2d 964 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). See also Holland
v. Nimitz, supra note 75.
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not interested in the estate had testified that certain persons taking
under the will had used undue influence on testator. The persons so
charged were barred from taking the witness stand and denying the
alleged wrongdoing. 7 A more gross injustice would be difficult to
imagine. The theory of the rule preventing testimony in denial of a
transaction is that when a witness is denying a transaction, he is
testifying to it as much as when he affirms it; and that he cannot be
permitted to do indirectly that which he cannot do directly. It is sub-
mitted that this line of reasoning stretches that principle to the
breaking point.
III. CRITIc sM OF THE STATUTES
The Dead Man's Statutes of the various states are open to all of
the objections urged against the interest disqualification in general.
They have been severely condemned by most modern writers in the
field of evidence."' A sampling of this critical commentary follows:
87 Harris v. Harris' Estate, supra note 86.
88 Critical analysis of various state statutes is found in the following articles:
Ladd, "Admission of Evidence Against Estates of Deceased Persons," 19 Iowa L. Rev.
521-539 (1934); Hale, "The California Dead Man's Statute," 9 So. Cal. L. Rev. 34-46
(1935); Ladd, "The Dead Man's Statute-Some Further Observations, and a Legisla-
tive Proposal," 26 Iowa L. Rev. 207-240 (1941); Harper, "The 'Dead Man' Rule," 6
Mercer L. Rev. 249-263 (1955); Ray, "The Dead Man's Statute-A Relic of the Past,"
10 Sw. L.J. 390-399 (1956); Chadbourn, "History and Interpretation of the California
Dead Man's Statute: A Proposal for Liberalization," 4 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 175-221 (1956);
Maguire, "Witnesses-Suppression of Testimony by Reason of Death," 6 Am. U.L. Rev.
1-21 (1957); Dadisman, "The West Virginia Dead Man's Statute," 60 W. Va. L. Rev.
239-252 (1958); Carpenter, "The Dead Man's Statute in Pennsylvania," 33 Temp. L.Q.
399-413 (1959).
Student Comments, several of which are excellent, include: "Incompetency of
Interested Witnesses in Actions Against Representative of a Deceased Person," 12 Neb. L.
Bull. 282-290 (1934); "Personal Transaction With Person Deceased at Time of Trial-
An Analysis of Cases and a Suggestion for Statutory Change," 41 W. Va. L.Q. 256-267
(1935); "The Ohio Dead Man's Statute," 3 Ohio St. L.J. 200-210 (1937); "Evidence by
Survivors: A Proposed Revision of the Illinois Statute, 31 Ill. L. Rev. 218-230 (1937) ;
"Competency of Witness-Transaction and Communication With a Deceased," 15 Wis.
L. Rev. 407-423 (1940); "The 'Dead Man's Statute' in Missouri," 23 Wash. U.L.Q. 343-
384 (1938); Recent Developments Under the Dead Man's Statute, 22 Wash. L. Rev.
211-221 (1947); "Dead Man's Statutes-Competency of Spouse of a Party or Interested
Person," 46 Mich. L. Rev. 664-672 (1948); "The Proposed Missouri Evidence Code-
A Symposium," 14 Mo. L. Rev. 259-266 (1949); "Admissibility of Survivor's Testimony
Under the Kentucky Dead Man's Statute," 38 Ky. L.J. 471-474 (1950); "The Ohio Dead
Man's Statute," 4 IV. Res. L. Rev. 61-73 (1949); "Testimony of Parties Against Repre-
sentatives or Heirs of Person Deceased," 30 N.D.L. Rev. 138-148 (1954); "Dead Man's
Statute-Tort Actions Within the Prohibition of the Statute," 39 Minn. L. Rev. 609-613
(1955); "Alabama Dead Man's Statute," 8 Ala. L. Rev. 301-310 (1956); "The Dead
Man's Statute and the Uniform Rules of Evidence," 11 Miami L.Q. 103-110 (1956);
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Dean Wigmore, the Master of American Evidence Law, denounced
the statutes in these words:
As a matter of policy, this survival of the now discarded interest-
disqualification is deplorable in every respect; for it is based upon
a fallacious and exploded principle, it leads to as much or more
false decision than it prevents, and it encumbers the profession with
a profuse mass of barren quibbles over the interpretation of mere
words.s9
Almost seventy years ago, Justice Corliss of North Dakota fired
a broadside at such statutes:
Statutes which exclude testimony on this ground are of doubtful
expediency. There are more honest claims defeated by them by
destroying the evidence to prove such claims than there would be
fictitious claims established if all such enactments were swept away,
and all persons rendered competent witnesses. To assume that in
that event many false claims would be established by perjury is
to place an extremely low estimate on human nature, and a very
high estimate on human ingenuity and adroitness. He who pos-
sesses no evidence to prove his case save that which such a statute
declares incompetent is remediless. But those against whom a dis-
honest demand is made are not left utterly unprotected because
death has sealed the lips of the only person who can contradict the
survivor, who supports his claim with his oath. In the legal armory,
there is a weapon whose repeated thrusts he will find is difficult,
and in many cases impossible, to parry if his testimony is a tissue
of falsehoods-the sword of cross-examination. °
An experienced Texas trial lawyer indicted the Texas statute on
three counts:
(1) It prevents recovery of just debts from the estate of decedent
debtors. If the number of honest men is greater than the number of
dishonest men, the number of honest claims against decedents is
likely to be greater than the number of dishonest claims. A statute
which closes the mouth of honest and dishonest claimants alike
does more harm than good, especially in view of the fact that the
dishonest claimant, if allowed to testify, is likely to be defeated
anyhow. (2) The time consumed in applying and interpreting the
statute is out of all proportion to the doubtful good it does. A
statute so difficult of definite limitation should be one of undoubted
desirability before it is justified. The statute cannot meet this test.
"The Dead Man's Rules as Applied to Tort Actions in Pennsylvania," 62 Dick. L. Rev.
174 (1958); "The Survival of a jurisprudential Anomaly-The Dead Man's Statute
in Wisconsin," 43 Marq. L. Rev. 73-88 (1959); "Waiver of Ohio Dead Man's Statute,"
11 W. Res. L. Rev. 630-648 (1960); "Effect of the Dead Man's Statute on the Testi-
mony of a Party Witness," 21 Md. L. Rev. 60-68 (1960); "Construing the Oklahoma
Dead Man's Statute," 14 Okla. L. Rev. 62-67 (1961).
89 2 Wigmore § 578.
90 St. John v. Lofland, 5 N.D. 140, 64 N.W. 930 (1895).
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(3) It has so befogged our decisions that the Courts and the Bar
do not yet know the limitations of the rule.91
Professor Morgan, one of the great evidence scholars of our
time and Reporter for the Model Code of Evidence, spoke of the
shortcomings of the statutes in these terms:
All are based upon the delusion that perjury can be prevented by
making interested persons incompetent or by excluding certain
classes of testimony. They persist in spite of experience which
demonstrates that they defeat the honest litigant and rarely, if ever,
prevent the dishonest from introducing the desired evidence; if the
dishonest party is prevented from committing perjury, he is not
prevented from suborning it. If the statutes protect the estates of
the dead from false claims, they damage the estates of the living to
a much greater extent. And frequently their application prevents
proof of a valid claim by the representative of decedent's estate.92
Professor McCormick, author of the leading one-volume treatise
on Evidence, utters this scathing criticism of the Dead Man Rule:
Most commentators agree that here again the expedient of refusing
altogether to listen to the survivor is, in the words of Bentham,
a "blind and brainless" technique. In seeking to avoid injustice to
one side, the statute-makers have ignored the equal possibility of
injustice to the other. The temptation to the survivor to fabricate
a claim or defense is obvious enough, so obvious indeed that any
jury will realize that his story must be cautiously heard. A search-
ing cross-examination will usually, in case of fraud, reveal dis-
crepancies inherent in the "tangled web" of deception. In any event,
the survivor's disqualification is more likely to balk the honest
than the dishonest survivor. One who would not stick at perjury
will hardly hesitate at suborning a third person, who would not
be disqualified, to swear to the false story.93
The case against the statutes may be summarized on the follow-
ing points:
(1) The statutes are based upon a fallacious philosophy, i.e.,
that the number of dishonest men is greater than the number of honest
ones; and that self-interest makes it probable that men will commit
perjury. These assumptions run contrary to all human experience.
(2) The statutes create an intolerable injustice by preventing
proof of honest claims and defenses. In seeking to avoid the possibility
of injustice to one side, they work a certain injustice to the other. It
is difficult to understand why all the concern is for the possibility of
91 Cheek, "Testimony as to Transactions With Decedents," 5 Texas L. Rev. 149,
172 (1927).
92 Morgan, Some Problems of Proof under the Anglo-American System of Litiga-
tion 187 (1956).
93 McCormick § 65.
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unfounded claims against the estate. Why is there no concern for loss
by the survivor who finds himself unable to prove his valid claim
against decedent's estate? Surely a litigant should not be deprived of
his claim merely because his adversary dies. It cannot be more impor-
tant to save dead men's estates from false claims than it is to save
living men's estates from loss by lack of proof.
(3) The statutes are psychologically unsound. They do not dis-
qualify many persons who are vitally interested in the outcome of the
suit but who have no direct pecuniary interest such as spouses of
parties, close relatives, or officials of corporate parties. On the other
hand, they often disqualify certain totally disinterested persons or
persons with only a slight pecuniary interest. The pecuniary interest
limitation is unsound.
(4) The statutes fail to accomplish their purported purpose
since they suppress only a small part of the opportunities for perjured
testimony. They block the testimony of the witness only as to certain
subjects, leaving him free to testify falsely as to other matters if he
sees fit to do so. Furthermore, a witness who will not stick at perjury
will not hesitate to suborn perjury by getting a third person to testify
as to those matters as to which his own testimony is barred.
(5) The statutes impede the search for truth. The real hazard
in shaping any exclusionary rule is that the jury cannot be expected
to make sensible findings when it is deprived of substantial parts of
available evidence bearing on the issue in dispute. The great danger
thus lies in the suppression of truth.
(6) The statutes underestimate the efficacy of cross-examination
in exposing falsehood, and the abilities of the judge and jury to
separate the false from the true. These safeguards have proved ade-
quate in other situations involving the testimony of parties and inter-
ested persons. Why not here?
(7) The statutes burden the parties with uncertainties and
appeals. For a hundred years or more, our courts have been struggling
with the interpretation of these statutes. The result is a labyrinth of
decisions which have often brought confusion rather than clarity. The
statutes continue to mystify able judges and lawyers in endless com-
plexities of interpretation and application. Within the limited space
available, it has been possible to touch upon only a very few of the
many problems arising under such statutes. But the vagaries and in-
consistencies pointed out are sufficient to demonstrate that the thou-
sands and thousands of decided cases have built here one of the most
complex and hazardous fields of the law of evidence.
94
94 A prominent Texas trial judge has recently said: "A legal beginner, as well as a
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IV. ALTERNATivES TO DEAD MAN'S STATUTES
If, as the writer has indicated, the Dead Man Rule is unsound,
what are the possible alternatives to such statutes? Since the philoso-
phy behind the disqualification is fallacious, the first expedient which
comes to mind is outright repeal of the statutes. By eliminating this
remnant of the interest disqualification, the same rules of competency
would apply here as in other cases. This step has been urged by many
of the writers of articles and comments cited in an earlier note. It has
much to recommend it-repeal would not only end the intolerable
injustice now possible, but would rid the courts of the vast amount of
useless litigation over the interpretation and application of the statutes.
It has never been demonstrated that the protection afforded by the
statutes is needed. England abolished incompetency based on interest
more than a hundred years ago and has never had a Dead Man's
Statute. Yet there has been no indication that dead men's estates have
been plundered in that country by false claimants. In this country,
Massachusetts and Rhode Island have no Dead Man's Statute. The
American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence?' and the Uniform
Rules of Evidence96 completely reject the dead man principle. The
main drawback to this solution is the difficulty of accomplishment.
The statutes have become so deeply rooted in the jurisprudence of the
various states that repeal is almost a virtual impossibility. This is
illustrated by the Pennsylvania experience. In 1952, the Committee
on Civil Law of the Pennsylvania Bar Association recommended the
removal of the disqualification.9 7 A statute was drafted by the Judicial
Administration Committee and referred to the Statutory Law Com-
mittee to secure its passage.9s The proposed act, repealing the Dead
Man Rule, was introduced in the 1953 session of the legislature, but
killed by the Senate Judiciary Committee.99 It should be mentioned,
veteran, well knows that, at its best, the Dead Man's Statute is full of snares, traps,
and pitfalls, and that we have a rule by a wilderness of uncertain cases as well as a
rule by an uncertain statute." Stout, "Should the Dead Man's Statute Apply to Auto-
mobile Collisions?," 38 Texas L. Rev. 14, 23 (1959). He mentions that a very large
Texas firm furnishes its trial advocates with a "table" without which they would be
"lost."
95 Model Code of Evidence rule 101 (1942). See the comment to the rule.
96 Uniform Rule of Evidence 7.
97 58 Annual Rep. of Pa. Bar Ass'n 38-39 (1952). See Carpenter, "The Dead Man's
Statute in Pennsylvania," 32 Temp. L.Q. 398, 412 (1959).
98 McWilliams, "Judicial Administration," 24 Pa. B.A.Q. 179 (1953). The language
of the proposed statute was: "(1) No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any
action, suit or proceeding by reason of an interest in the event of the same as a party
or otherwise. (2) All Acts of the Assembly inconsistent herewith are repealed."
99 Erwin, "Report of Committee on Judicial Administration," 25 Pa. B.A.Q. 372,
373 (1954).
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however, that New Jersey has recently amended its statute to eliminate
the disqualification of the survivor.00 But it added a restriction that
the party who asserts a claim or defense against a representative of
the decedent supported by oral testimony must establish it by clear
and convincing evidence. This is somewhat akin to the restriction dis-
cussed below under (2).
Short of repeal of existing statutes, what other solutions are
possible? The legislatures of a few states have adopted various modi-
fications of the Dead Man Rule. These are of three types: (1) Per-
mitting the interested survivor to testify when it appears to the trial
judge that injustice would result if his testimony were excluded; (2)
Admitting testimony by the survivor, but allowing no verdict or
judgment to be rendered thereon unless such testimony is corroborated
by other disinterested evidence; (3) Admitting testimony of the sur-
vivor and also any relevant hearsay declarations or statements of the
deceased.
(1) In Montana and Arizona, the statutes contain dead man
prohibitions in more or less typical terms, but then provide that the
trial judge shall have discretion to admit testimony by the survivor
when it appears to the judge that its exclusion would cause injustice.10
New Hampshire formerly had such a statute.102 On the surface it may
appear that this expedient is a desirable means of alleviating the
harshness of the Dead Man Rule. It has, however, serious defects.
Trial judges prefer definite rules of admission and exclusion and
are reluctant to exercise discretion in individual instances. More-
over, appellate courts seize the first opportunity to formulate rules
for the guidance of trial courts, thus practically abrogating their
discretion. In New Hampshire, for example, fixed rules became estab-
lished regularly admitting survivor's testimony as to matters unknown
to decedents, and regularly excluding it as to matters known to
decedents. 10 3 Furthermore, the injustice had to be shown by evidence
100 N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:81-2 (1961), as amended effective July 1, 1960, now reads:
When one party to any civil action is a lunatic suing or defending by guardian
or when one party sues or is sued in a representative capacity, any other party
who asserts a claim or an affirmative defense against such lunatic or representa-
tive supported by oral testimony of a promise, statement or act of the lunatic
while of sound mind or of the decedent, shall be required to establish the same
by clear and convincing proof.
The amended statute was construed by Staudter v. Elter, 64 N.J. Super. 432, 166 A.2d
394 (1961), as eliminating the disqualification of parties as to transactions with decedents.
101 Mont. Rev. Code § 93-701-3 (1947) ("when it appears to the court that,
without the testimony of the witness, injustice will be done"); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 12-2251 (1956) ("required to testify thereto by the court").
102 N.H. Laws, 1926, ch. 336, § 28.
103 Cobb v. Follansbee, 79 N.H. 205, 107 Atl. 630 (1919).
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other than that of the survivor.' Thus the judge's discretion could
be used only to receive evidence which came in under the ordinary
Dead Man's Statutes. In 1941, New Hampshire amended its statute in
an attempt to provide broader judicial discretion.' Apparently this
was also unsuccessful," 6 and, in 1953, the practice was abandoned.
1 7
In Montana, the survivor's testimony will not be admitted until suffi-
cient other testimony has been admitted to warrant the court, in the exer-
cise of its discretion, to render a ruling in favor of the questionable
testimony. 08 In Arizona, where the language of the statute reads,
"required to testify thereto by the court," recent decisions indicate
that full discretion has been maintained despite earlier rulings indicat-
ing a limitation like that in Montana.0" It is believed that this type
of modification will alleviate very few of the hardships caused by the
usual Dead Man's Statute.
(2) The second type of legislation-admission of the interested
survivor's testimony coupled with a provision that no verdict or judg-
ment shall be obtained on his uncorroborated testimony-is found in
New Mexico," Oregon"' and Virginia," although the two latter
states add a provision somewhat akin to that discussed in the next
alternative. While this modification has been considered by some to
be an improvement over the typical Dead Man's Statute, it has serious
defects. The philosophy behind such statutes is similar to that under-
lying the average Dead Man Rule-the assumption that uncorrobo-
rated claims are of such doubtful validity that all must be rejected.
In Oregon, the survivor apparently must make out a prima facie case
104 Morgan, The Law of Evidence-Some Proposals for Its Reform 29 (1927).
105 N.H. Laws, 1941, ch. 132.
106 Broderick v. Blaisdell, 97 N.H. 338, 88 A.2d 174 (1952).
107 N.H. Laws, 1953, ch. 182.
108 Cox. v. Williamson, 124 Mont. 512, 227 P.2d 614 (1951). Earlier cases per-
mitted the exercise of discretion by the judge only when such testimony was necessary
to make a case for the jury. Rowe v. Eggrim, 107 Mont. 378, 87 P.2d 189 (1938).
109 Garza v. Fernandez, 74 Ariz. 312, 248 P.2d 869 (1952); Goff v. Guyton, 86
Ariz. 349, 346 P.2d 286 (1959). See 2 Ariz. L. Rev. 284 (1960). A limitation like that in
Montana was indicated in earlier cases. Goldman v. Sotelo, 7 Ariz. 23, 60 Pac. 696
(1900).
110 N.M. Stat. Ann. ch. 20, §§ 2-5 (1953) (". . .unless such evidence is cor-
roborated by some other material evidence").
111 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 44.020 (1953) makes all parties competent witnesses. § 116.555
says: ". . .No other claim which has been rejected by the executor shall be allowed
except upon some competent, satisfactory evidence other than the testimony of the
claimant."
112 Va. Code, tit. 8, § 286 (1950): . . . No judgment or decree shall be ren-
dered in favor of an adverse or interested party founded on his uncorroborated
testimony."
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without his own testimony.11 3 These statutes have been termed mis-
guided." 4 The few cases in which they assist the survivor are those
in which he least needs it, i.e., where he has other sufficient proof.
The survivor who has no evidence except his own testimony is just
as frustrated as under the conventional Dead Man's Statute. The New
Mexico court condemned the arbitrary feature of the statute in pre-
venting recovery by a claimant whose testimony the court believed
to be true." 5 Where the survivor is defending a claim instead of
asserting one, the rule of corroboration seems especially out of place.
An additional objection to the corroboration requirement is the
difficulty in administering such a rule. How can corroboration be
defined in a way so that the test can be applied in individual cases
without resulting in substantial litigation? If, as is believed, the
requirement is unsound, the courts should not be burdened with its
administration.
(3) The third alternative is a form of statute which permits
the survivor to testify without restriction but seeks to minimize the
danger of injustice to decedent's estate by creating a special excep-
tion to the hearsay rule for any relevant oral declarations or written
statements of the decedent. The oldest statute of this type is that of
Connecticut."' This is the solution recommended in 1927 by the Com-
mittee of the Commonwealth Fund1 17 and in 1938 by the Committee
on Improvements in the Law of Evidence of the American Bar Asso-
ciation."' In 1939, South Dakota adopted a statute in the form recom-
mended by the above-named groups." 9 A recent adherent to this ap-
proach is New Hampshire. 2 ° The rationale of this approach is that by
113 Goltra v. Penland, 45 Ore. 254, 265, 77 Pac. 129, 133 (1904): ". . . there must
be other material and pertinent testimony supporting or corroborating that given by him,
sufficient to go to the jury and upon which it may find a verdict...
114 7 Wigmore § 2065.
115 Bujac v. Wilson, 27 N.M. 105, 196 Pac. 327 (1921).
116 Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 7895 (1949): "In actions by or against the repre-
sentatives of deceased persons . . . the entries, memoranda and declarations of the
deceased, relevant to the matter in issue, may be received in evidence. .. .
117 Morgan, op. cit. supra note 104, at 35.
118 63 A.B.A.R. 597 (1938).
110 S.D. Code § 36.0104 (1939): "In actions, suits or proceedings by or against the
representatives of deceased persons including proceedings for the probate of wills, any
statement of the deceased whether oral or written shall not be excluded as hearsay, pro-
vided that the trial judge shall first find as a fact that the statement was made by
decedent, and that it was in good faith and on decedent's personal knowledge."
120 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 516.25 (1955). The Virginia and Oregon statutes also
create an exception to the hearsay rule for declarations of the decedent. However, in
Virginia it applies only if the adverse party testifies. Va. Code, tit. 8, § 286 (1950). In
Oregon it applies only if the adverse party appears as -a witness in his own behalf or
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freeing the oral declarations and writings of decedent from the stric-
tures of the hearsay rule, most of the reason for the Dead Man's
Statute is removed. 2' As to the special exception to the hearsay rule
thus created, it has as much or more to justify it than some of the
other generally recognized exceptions.'22 While there is no oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the deceased personally, this is not present in
any of the exceptions admitting hearsay evidence. This type of legisla-
tion is by far the best yet enacted. It prevents the injustice caused
by the Dead Man Rule, affords adequate protection to decedent's
estate, and eliminates the difficult problems of administration.
V. RECOMMENDED LEGISLATION
Based upon an experience of many years participation in drafting
and sponsoring bills designed to improve the law of evidence in his
own state (several of which have been adopted) and having devoted
particular effort to proposals seeking a modification of the Dead
Man's Statute of his state (which has not yet been adopted), the
writer of this paper offers a statute which he believes will accomplish
all the desired objectives and at the same time offers some reasonable
prospect of adoption. The draft is as follows:
In actions by or against executors or administrators, in which
judgment may be rendered for or against them as such, and in all
actions by or against the heirs or legal representatives of a de-
cedent arising out of any transaction with such decedent, the fol-
lowing provisions shall apply:
(a) Either party if otherwise qualified shall be competent to
testify.
(b) If any party shall testify to any transaction with or statement
by the decedent, any adverse party may prove the statements, oral
"or written, of the decedent, relevant to the matters in issue, as
evidence of the facts stated.
(c) In passing upon the credibility of the testimony of a party
as to any transactions with or statement by the decedent, his
interest shall be considered, and if his testimony, though uncon-
tradicted, is not satisfactory and convincing, the court or jury shall
not be bound to find in accordance therewith, and in a case tried
to a jury, the jury shall be instructed as provided in this paragraph.
offers evidence of statements made by deceased against the interest of the deceased.
Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. tit. 4, ch. 41, § 850 (1953). Massachusetts and Rhode Island
have statutes admitting declarations of any deceased persons in any action. Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 233, § 65 (1956); R.I. Gen. Laws ch. 538, § 6 (1938).
121 Quick, "A Reappraisal of Rule 63(4)," 6 Wayne L. Rev. 204, 216 (1960).
122 Ladd, "The Dead Man's Statute: Some Further Observations and a Legislative
Proposal," 26 Iowa L. Rev. 207, 238 (1941).
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The proposed statute would make all interested parties competent
to testify in suits involving transactions with deceased persons, just
as they are in all other suits. This means that the main sources for
exposing false testimony available in all cases would be relied on here.
These are, of course, the bringing of honest witnesses when they are
available to counter the false with the true, and, secondly, the test of
cross-examination by which fraud and perjury can so often be exposed.
But the proposal provides additional safeguards. If one of the
parties testifies to a transaction, this opens the door to the other
parties, who would usually be those defending the interests of the
estate, to introduce evidence of oral declarations or written state-
ments made by the deceased in his lifetime as evidence of the facts
stated-thus making him a witness for himself from the grave. If
someone claimed an oral contract or payment, what the deceased said
or wrote about the matter would give his version to the court. This
creates, of course, a new exception to the hearsay rule, but one fully
justified. It would often be an effective answer to false claims.
The other built-in safeguards are the provisions for instructions
to the jury concerning the party's interest and the fact that the jury
is not bound to find in accordance with his unsupported testimony.
It is believed that these provisions open the door to honest wit-
nesses now barred, and as to the dishonest ones, provide reasonable
protection. The average jury will be inclined to view with great caution
the testimony of a party-witness to a transaction with one now dead
when he is not supported by other witnesses.
The proposed statute omits any reference to suits involving
guardians of infants and insane persons which are included within the
provisions of many Dead Man's Statutes. This omission is made
because of the relative infrequency with which questions arise in
respect to actions by or against guardians, because of the need for
simplicity, and because to omit them will permit parties in such suits
to testify under the general statutory provisions making all parties
competent witnesses.
